C Raja Mohan writes: Beyond US and China, India and others are building a ‘G Minus Two’ for Indo-Pacific

The 'G Minus Two' concept represents a strategic adaptation by Asian middle powers to the evolving dynamics of the US-China relationship. Historically, Indian strategists have been wary of a G2 condominium, where Washington and Beijing dictate global terms. The current approach is not about creating an anti-China bloc or abandoning the US security umbrella. Rather, it focuses on expanding strategic autonomy by building overlapping bilateral and minilateral partnerships among nations like India, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. This network aims to widen the geopolitical room for manoeuvre, allowing these nations to manage the reality of Chinese power without being solely reliant on US leadership, especially given recent uncertainties in American foreign policy. This highlights the importance of the Indo-Pacific construct, emphasizing a free, open, and inclusive region, where ASEAN centrality and bilateral ties (like those being strengthened by PM Modi's visits) form the core of a multipolar Asia.

A crucial driver of the 'G Minus Two' strategy is the need for economic resilience and de-risking. The high level of economic interdependence between Asian nations and China makes complete decoupling unrealistic. For instance, India's bilateral trade with China remains significant, as does the trade volume of Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN nations. The strategy aims to mitigate the vulnerability to Beijing's potential weaponization of interdependence (e.g., controlling critical supply chains or using trade as leverage). By strengthening ties among themselves, these nations seek to build alternative supply chains, secure critical minerals (especially with partners like Australia), and enhance technological cooperation (leveraging Japan and South Korea's expertise). This aligns with India's domestic goals of Make in India and expanding its defence industrial base, as the depth of these international partnerships ultimately depends on India's internal economic competitiveness and modernization.

While not a formal military alliance, the 'G Minus Two' approach involves deepened defence and security cooperation to ensure a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Recognizing that China's military modernization cannot be balanced by any single Asian power alone, nations are intensifying their defence ties. India and Indonesia, despite their non-aligned traditions, have both become Major Defence Partners of the US. Furthermore, they are expanding their bilateral maritime security cooperation, recognizing Indonesia's critical position linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This involves intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and capacity building. The inclusion of Australia strengthens maritime domain awareness and stability in the eastern Indian Ocean. This layered security architecture, involving minilateral groupings like the Quad alongside stronger bilateral ties, is designed to ensure freedom of navigation and adherence to a rules-based international order in the face of an increasingly assertive China.