150+
mock exams
17,855
tests completed
2,28,478
questions answered
This article analyzes the strategic implications of China's growing conventional missile arsenal, particularly its deployment of over 200 launchers opposite India. It argues that China’s missile superiority threatens to reshape warfare by enabling strikes deep into Indian territory without crossing the nuclear threshold, necessitating a fundamental shift in India's defence strategy, specifically the development of a dedicated, conventional .
The article highlights a critical shift in modern warfare: the use of conventional missiles for political coercion and counter-value strikes (targeting civilian/economic infrastructure to break the enemy's will), alongside traditional counter-force operations (targeting military assets). China’s arsenal, including the DF-15B, DF-16, and DF-21C for border targets, and the dual-role DF-26 capable of striking deep into India, neutralizes the strategic depth historically provided by the Himalayas. Furthermore, the deployment of hypersonic missiles like the DF-100 eliminates launch warning time. To counter this, India must move beyond viewing missiles merely as nuclear deterrents and build a credible conventional missile inventory capable of inflicting comparable damage, thereby establishing mutual vulnerability. This necessitates a doctrinal shift towards incorporating counter-value strikes and integrating a dedicated Rocket Force capable of engaging strategic, operational, and tactical targets across the Western Theatre Command of the People's Liberation Army.
A key argument is the necessity of institutional restructuring to effectively manage a modern missile force. Currently, India’s missile capabilities are fragmented across different services, lacking unified targeting and real-time execution capabilities. The creation of a dedicated Rocket Force, structured under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), is essential for operational effectiveness and rapid response. Keeping such a force service-specific (e.g., exclusively under the Army or Air Force) would lead to siloed target lists and slower decision-making, which is detrimental in time-sensitive missile warfare. Crucially, the Rocket Force must possess pre-delegated launch authority for precautionary strikes; relying on high-level political clearance for every conventional strike during the opening hours of a conflict could result in early defeat. This highlights the ongoing debate within India regarding jointness and theaterisation of its armed forces.
India's ability to match China's missile challenge is constrained by its domestic defence industrial base. While the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has developed systems like the Agni missile series, Nirbhay, and BrahMos, India faces critical gaps in advanced air propulsion, semiconductors, and high-grade materials, leading to reliance on foreign suppliers—a significant strategic vulnerability. The article underscores the need for indigenisation and self-reliance in defence manufacturing, emphasizing that private sector participation must expand beyond mere component supply to end-to-end manufacturing. Fast-tracking the development of hypersonic glide vehicles and expanding intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) inventories are crucial. Until a Rocket Force is operational, interim measures such as hardening airbases, dispersing assets, and enhancing satellite surveillance to detect mobile launchers are vital for survivability.