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This editorial argues against the notion of funding scientific research in India by imposing taxes on 'frivolous' industries like sports (e.g., IPL) or entertainment. The author contends that such a zero-sum approach is economically flawed and that the real constraints on Indian science funding are bureaucratic inefficiencies, restrictive procurement rules, and excessive regulations, rather than a lack of capital per se.
The author critiques the notion that wealth is a zero-sum game (where a gain for one sector must mean a loss for another). Taxing 'frivolous' industries overlooks the multiplier effect (the proportional amount of increase in final income that results from an injection of spending) these sectors have on allied industries like merchandise, broadcasting, and hospitality. Imposing such taxes acts as a Pigouvian tax (a tax assessed against private individuals or businesses for engaging in activities that create adverse side effects for society), which is misapplied here as these industries do not create negative externalities justifying a penalty to fund science. Furthermore, the author points out that imposing Goods and Services Tax (GST) and high import duties on scientific equipment acts as a rent on knowledge creation, effectively stifling research. Reducing these barriers, rather than creating new taxes, would improve the flow of capital into research and development.
The article highlights severe bureaucratic bottlenecks in scientific funding, reflecting broader issues in Indian public administration. Funds are allocated in rigidly compartmentalised categories (e.g., consumables vs. electronics), preventing flexible and efficient use of resources. This creates perverse incentives where scientists buy what is 'allowed' rather than what is 'needed', leading to suboptimal utilisation of grants. This is reminiscent of the bureaucratic hurdles seen during the Licence Raj (an elaborate system of licences, regulations, and accompanying red tape that were required to set up and run businesses in India between 1947 and 1990). Furthermore, the mandatory use of the Government e-Marketplace (GeM) for procurement often delays research and forces the purchase of inferior domestic equipment due to an import substitution policy (a trade and economic policy which advocates replacing foreign imports with domestic production), which shields domestic manufacturers from global competition but harms scientific output.
The piece addresses structural barriers to private and foreign investment in Indian R&D. The author notes that restrictive regulations under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 (FCRA) make it difficult for research institutions to attract international funding. Additionally, rigid rules governing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds often incentivise short-term, low-risk projects rather than fundamental, long-term scientific research. The author advocates for liberalising these mechanisms, arguing that private endowments, which are driven by outcomes, are often more efficient allocators of capital for research than centralized bureaucracies. Addressing these bottlenecks, along with reforming the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 to facilitate better recruitment, is essential for India to enhance its scientific capabilities and retain top talent.