The Delhi government recently announced the Lakshmi Yojana, an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) scheme promising ₹2,500 monthly to eligible women, adding to a growing trend of state-level UCTs. However, recent economic assessments, including those from the and the Economic Survey, highlight the substantial fiscal burden these schemes place on state finances. Consequently, some states are rationalising these schemes, leading to a reduction in the number of beneficiaries to manage costs.
The proliferation of Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCTs) at the state level raises critical concerns about fiscal prudence and debt sustainability. State governments operate under borrowing constraints mandated by the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBM Act), which limits their fiscal deficit (the gap between total revenue and total expenditure). Implementing recurring, large-scale UCTs often requires states to either increase borrowing or divert funds from essential capital expenditure (like infrastructure, which has a higher multiplier effect on economic growth). The 16th Finance Commission (a constitutional body under Article 280 that recommends the distribution of tax revenues between the Union and States) and the Economic Survey have flagged this trend. When states face revenue shortfalls, the committed expenditure on UCTs forces them to rationalise or cut down beneficiary lists, as observed in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. For UPSC, analyze the trade-off between welfare expenditure and capital expenditure, and how excessive revenue expenditure impacts a state's long-term economic growth and debt-to-GDP ratio.
The implementation and subsequent 'rationalisation' of cash transfer schemes expose significant challenges in welfare administration and targeting. UCTs are debated as alternatives to targeted subsidies or in-kind transfers (like the Public Distribution System). While UCTs reduce administrative overhead and leakage (often facilitated by the JAM Trinity - Jan Dhan, Aadhaar, Mobile), defining and maintaining the 'eligible' beneficiary pool is complex. The article notes that states are reducing beneficiary numbers under the guise of 'rationalisation'. This highlights the political economy of welfare: schemes are often announced during elections (raising concerns about freebies vs. legitimate welfare) but become fiscally unsustainable post-election. The Supreme Court has periodically debated the issue of 'freebies' and their impact on free and fair elections. Aspirants should evaluate the effectiveness of UCTs versus conditional cash transfers (like Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana), focusing on targeting errors (inclusion/exclusion errors) and the political motivations behind such schemes.
Targeting UCTs specifically towards women is a strategy often aimed at women's empowerment and addressing gender inequality. Proponents argue that placing cash directly in the hands of women increases their financial autonomy, bargaining power within the household, and improves investments in child nutrition and education. This aligns with the Directive Principles of State Policy, particularly Article 39(a) (right to an adequate means of livelihood) and Article 46 (promotion of economic interests of weaker sections). However, the reduction in beneficiaries due to fiscal constraints undermines these potential social benefits. If the eligibility criteria are narrowed or schemes are inconsistently funded, the intended safety net becomes unreliable. For Mains, critically examine whether UCTs are a silver bullet for poverty alleviation and gender empowerment, or if they need to be supplemented with structural interventions like skill development, employment generation (like MGNREGA), and improved public services in health and education.