Will increasing the strength of the SC solve the pendency problem?

The mechanism for increasing the number of Supreme Court judges is established under Article 124(1) of the Constitution of India, which originally set the strength at a Chief Justice and seven other judges, leaving it to Parliament to increase this number by law. Historically, Parliament has enacted legislation like the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 and subsequent amendments to gradually increase the sanctioned strength. The use of an ordinance (under Article 123) to achieve this, especially when Parliament is expected to convene soon, raises concerns about legislative propriety and bypassing the ordinary legislative process. Furthermore, the article highlights a critical debate regarding Article 136 (Special Leave to Appeal). Originally intended as an extraordinary, residual power to be used sparingly to prevent gross injustice, its overuse has significantly contributed to the docket explosion. The Supreme Court's reluctance to formulate strict guidelines for entertaining Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) means a large portion of its time is consumed by routine appeals rather than settling substantial questions of constitutional or legal importance. For UPSC, understanding the tension between the Supreme Court's role as a final court of appeal versus a constitutional court is crucial.

The problem of judicial pendency is inextricably linked to the government's role as the largest litigant in India. The article underscores the urgent need for a robust National Litigation Policy (NLP) to curb unnecessary government litigation. An effective NLP would theoretically prioritize alternative dispute resolution, prevent the state from pursuing frivolous appeals, and ensure a consistent legal strategy across departments and changes in law officers. Currently, the lack of such a policy results in situations where the government frequently files transfer petitions to the Supreme Court instead of allowing High Courts to conclusively adjudicate similar cases pending across different states. This approach not only overburdens the apex court but also delays justice for individual litigants who lack the state's resources. From a governance perspective, reducing pendency requires moving beyond merely increasing judge strength (supply-side reform) to actively managing the inflow of cases (demand-side reform) through better litigation management by the state.

Increasing the number of judges presents a paradox: while it may seem like a logical solution to pendency, it can inadvertently exacerbate other institutional challenges. The article points out that a higher sanctioned strength often leads to the creation of more Division Benches (two-judge benches). This 'polyvocality' increases the likelihood of conflicting rulings by coordinate benches on similar points of law. When such doctrinal inconsistencies arise, they necessitate reference to larger Constitution Benches for authoritative resolution, thereby creating further delays and negating the intended benefit of 'speedy justice'. Therefore, institutional reforms must accompany numerical increases. These reforms include stricter adherence to guidelines for entertaining Public Interest Litigations (PILs), as laid down in cases like State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010), to filter out frivolous claims. Additionally, implementing better case management strategies, such as setting strict time limits for oral arguments and relying more on written submissions, are essential to optimize judicial time. Candidates should focus on these structural and procedural reforms when addressing questions on judicial efficacy.