Women’s reservation should be implemented without delimitation: Justice Hariparanthaman

The article highlights the debate surrounding the Delimitation Commission, a body established under Article 82 of the Constitution, responsible for redrawing parliamentary and assembly constituency boundaries based on the latest Census. The 84th Constitutional Amendment Act of 2001 froze the number of Lok Sabha and State Assembly seats until the first Census conducted after 2026 to encourage population control measures, particularly in southern states. The former judge argues that women's reservation, mandated by the 106th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2023 (Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam), should not be contingent upon the completion of this delimitation exercise and the decennial Census. This raises a crucial constitutional question about the sequencing of representation reforms and whether linking a fundamental right like equal political participation to administrative exercises like the Census and delimitation is justifiable. The debate underscores the tension between ensuring demographic proportionality and maintaining political stability.

The potential unfreezing of delimitation post-2026 poses a significant challenge to Indian Federalism. If seats are reallocated strictly based on the current population (as mandated by Article 81), states with successful family planning policies, predominantly in the South (like Tamil Nadu and Kerala), will see their proportional representation in the Lok Sabha decline compared to Northern states with higher population growth (like UP and Bihar). This is perceived as penalizing states for effective governance and demographic management. To mitigate this, experts suggest alternative models, such as adopting a 'digressive proportionality system' (like in Brazil) for the Lok Sabha, which balances population with a minimum baseline representation for smaller states, or restructuring the Rajya Sabha on the lines of the U.S. Senate, where all states have equal representation regardless of population, thereby safeguarding regional interests against numerical dominance.

The article critiques the institutional design of the Delimitation Commission, pointing out that Article 329(a) places its proposals inside a constitutional 'black box,' barring judicial review of the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies. An expert suggests that this lack of oversight is problematic and proposes adopting a 'dialogue model' similar to Canada, where a parliamentary sub-committee reviews and provides feedback on the Commission's proposals. This highlights a critical governance issue: balancing the independence of an expert body with democratic accountability and parliamentary oversight. Furthermore, the argument that increasing the number of Lok Sabha seats (beyond 543) might hamper 'meaningful deliberations' touches upon the practical challenges of managing large legislative bodies and ensuring effective parliamentary functioning, suggesting that size should not compromise the quality of debate.