A Court divided by its own architecture

The central issue revolves around Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that any case involving a 'substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution' must be heard by a minimum of five judges (a Constitution Bench). The split verdict occurred because one judge believed the new law required interpretation by a five-judge bench, while the other argued the core constitutional principle—insulating the Election Commission of India from exclusive executive control—was already settled by a five-judge bench in Anoop Baranwal vs Union of India (2023). This debate touches on stare decisis (the legal principle of determining points in litigation according to precedent) and whether every new statute automatically raises a fresh 'substantial question of law' requiring a Constitution Bench.

The article highlights the systemic issue of judicial delay caused by the Supreme Court's current architecture. The court, originally intended to sit en banc (together) to interpret the Constitution, now functions largely in smaller panels, primarily dealing with appeals. Forming a Constitution Bench requires the Chief Justice of India (CJI) to spare five judges from their regular duties, leading to significant delays. These delays often result in a fait accompli (a thing that has already happened or been decided before those affected hear about it, leaving them with no option but to accept it). For example, by the time the challenge to the new Election Commissioner appointment law is decided, multiple elections may have already been conducted under its provisions. This delay is increasingly viewed as an 'institutional embarrassment'.

To address these structural inefficiencies, the article discusses the proposal for a permanent Constitution Bench. The Law Commission of India, in its 229th report, recommended establishing a dedicated Constitution Bench in Delhi, with regional benches handling ordinary appeals. While the CJI, in his capacity as the Master of the Roster (the administrative authority to allocate cases and constitute benches), has the power to create a permanent Constitution Bench without a constitutional amendment, the article raises concerns about the concentration of this power. It suggests that the composition of such a bench should be governed by transparent, pre-determined, and bright-line rules to ensure institutional confidence and mitigate the perception that bench allocation shapes judicial outcomes.