360° UPSC Mains Analysis

The judiciary (specifically the Supreme Court and High Courts) is a subject under the Union List (List I) of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 77 of List I covers the constitution, organisation, jurisdiction, and powers of the Supreme Court, while Entry 78 covers the constitution and organisation of the High Courts. Therefore, the regulation of judicial conduct, removal, and inquiry procedures falls exclusively within the legislative domain of the Union Parliament.

The constitutional framework for the removal of judges of the higher judiciary is governed by Article 124(4) and Article 124(5) of the Constitution of India, which are made applicable to High Court judges via Article 217(1)(b). During the Constituent Assembly debates, the framers sought to balance judicial independence with accountability, rejecting executive-led removal in favor of a rigorous parliamentary process. To operationalize this, Parliament enacted the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, which outlines the statutory procedure for investigating charges of 'proved misbehaviour or incapacity' against a judge.

Since independence, the policy on judicial accountability has evolved from a purely parliamentary removal process to a dual-track system involving internal peer review. In C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee (1995), the Supreme Court established the 'in-house procedure' to address judicial misconduct falling short of impeachable offenses, which was formally adopted by a full-court resolution in 1999. Despite legislative attempts to formalize accountability, such as the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 (which lapsed), the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 remains the sole statutory framework. The recent 2025–2026 proceedings against Justice Yashwant Varma have highlighted the persistent legal lacuna regarding whether statutory inquiries can continue after a judge's resignation.

The resignation of Justice Yashwant Varma in April 2026 directly mirrors the 2011 cases of Justice P.D. Dinakaran (Chief Justice of the Sikkim High Court) and Justice Soumitra Sen (Calcutta High Court). In both historical instances, the judges utilized voluntary resignation under Article 217(1)(a) to effectively halt or render infructuous the parliamentary removal proceedings initiated under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. These parallels underscore a recurring systemic challenge where the constitutional right to resign is deployed to preempt statutory findings of judicial misconduct.

The demand for an independent judiciary free from executive control was a core tenet of the Indian national movement, formally raised as early as the 1886 session of the Indian National Congress. This historical aspiration directly shaped the post-independence constitutional design, which deliberately made the removal of judges exceptionally difficult to protect them from political or executive pressure.

Judicial corruption and the lack of accountability directly diminish the common citizen's dignity and their daily struggle for justice, fostering a sense of helplessness against systemic power. It erodes public trust in the rule of law, leading citizens to believe that justice is a commodity accessible only to the wealthy and influential. This trust deficit deters ordinary people from approaching courts, thereby denying them timely resolution of disputes and affecting their livelihoods and mental well-being.

The issue directly impinges upon Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which encompasses the right to a fair trial and an unbiased judiciary as essential components of the right to life and personal liberty. It also violates Article 14 (Equality before Law), as allowing judges to escape statutory inquiry and potential consequences simply by resigning creates an unequal standard of accountability compared to ordinary public servants. Furthermore, it undermines the Directive Principle under Article 39A, which mandates the State to secure equal justice and free legal aid for all citizens.

As a public administrator, the primary ethical conflict lies between institutional accountability and procedural due process, specifically whether to pursue an inquiry against a resigned official to uphold public trust or to terminate it to conserve administrative resources. There is also a conflict of 'duty vs. pragmatism'—balancing the moral imperative to establish absolute truth and deter future misconduct against the practical reality that the individual no longer holds public office. Additionally, ensuring that the pursuit of accountability does not violate the individual's right to a fair hearing under the principles of natural justice presents a significant challenge.

The erosion of judicial integrity disproportionately impacts vulnerable groups such as Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), women, and the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS), who rely on the judiciary as the ultimate shield against exploitation. When the credibility of the judiciary is compromised by corruption allegations, these marginalized populations lose faith in seeking legal redress, further deepening their socio-economic marginalization. A compromised justice system weakens the enforcement of protective legislations like the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.