Supreme Court notice to Centre on plea to deny perks to judges resigning to avoid removal procedure

The Indian Constitution guarantees the independence of the higher judiciary by providing security of tenure. A judge of the Supreme Court or High Court can only be removed through a rigorous process of impeachment under Article 124(4) and Article 217, respectively. This process requires a motion supported by a special majority in both houses of Parliament, based on proven misbehaviour or incapacity. The procedure is further detailed in the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, which involves an investigation by a three-member committee. The petition highlights a critical loophole: the Constitution allows judges to resign voluntarily (by writing to the President). However, it does not explicitly differentiate between a standard resignation and one submitted to short-circuit a pending impeachment process. The plea argues that allowing judges to retain pension and perks after resigning to dodge an inquiry defeats the purpose of the rigorous removal mechanism and undermines judicial accountability. For UPSC, this raises questions about the balance between judicial independence and the need for effective disciplinary mechanisms, potentially prompting discussions on reforms like the proposed Judges (Inquiry) Bill, 2006 (which lapsed) aimed at creating a National Judicial Oversight Committee.

The issue underscores a broader governance challenge concerning all constitutional functionaries, such as the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) or the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), who enjoy similar protections against arbitrary removal. These protections are designed to ensure they can discharge their duties without fear of executive reprisal. However, the petition argues that these protections come with a 'constitutional obligation' to complete the tenure. Using resignation as an 'easy option' to avoid a transparent removal procedure while retaining financial benefits creates a perverse incentive structure. It highlights a regulatory gap where the absence of a deterrent (monetary or otherwise) allows functionaries to escape accountability for alleged misconduct. This touches upon the concept of institutional integrity, suggesting that the rules governing post-retirement benefits should perhaps be contingent on an unblemished record or the successful completion of tenure, rather than just the holding of the office.

From an ethical standpoint, the petition touches upon the core values of probity in public life, accountability, and institutional trust. Constitutional functionaries are expected to maintain the highest standards of integrity. Resigning to avoid an inquiry, particularly when serious allegations (like the recovery of cash) are involved, can be viewed as an attempt to evade moral and legal responsibility. This behavior undermines public trust in democratic institutions. The ethical dilemma lies in balancing the legal right to resign with the moral obligation to face a 'transparent procedure of removal.' The petition asserts that such resignations are 'unconstitutional and unprincipled' because they betray the confidence placed in these high offices. In GS Paper 4, this scenario serves as a strong case study on the limitations of purely legal frameworks in ensuring ethical conduct and the need for mechanisms that actively discourage the evasion of accountability.