‘Early Harvest’ — larger but not necessarily safer

Context
The 25th round of talks on the India-China boundary issue resulted in an 'Eight Points of Outcomes and Consensus'. This document revived the concept of an 'Early and Substantial Harvest' for boundary delimitation, primarily focusing on the Middle and Sikkim sectors, raising concerns about potential asymmetric outcomes favoring China.
Exam perspectives
The boundary dispute between India and China spans across the Western, Middle, and Eastern sectors. The phrase 'Early and Substantial Harvest' was originally an Indian proposal to settle the Sikkim Sector along with the entire Middle Sector using the watershed principle (delineating the boundary along the highest mountain crests). However, China's interpretation often leans towards an 'agreement with holes', seeking settlements only where claims converge while leaving complex trijunctions (like the Doklam Plateau) and contested pockets undefined. This approach undermines the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles, which mandates a 'package settlement' covering all sectors to ensure strategic balance through cross-sector concessions. The article argues that a piecemeal approach, settling easier areas while leaving complex ones to China's advantage, could weaken India's overall negotiating position.
The geographical nuances of the Sikkim Sector are crucial. The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 serves as the basis, but its Article I contains contradictions: it establishes the watershed crest as the boundary but also names Mount Gipmochi, which lies south of the true watershed, as the starting point. India relies on historical British maps (1907, 1913) prioritizing the highest-watershed principle, placing the trijunction at Batang La. China, conversely, uses a literal reading to push the trijunction south to the Jampheri Ridge. A delimitation based solely on the 1890 text without clarifying this could lead Beijing to claim the southern trijunction, significantly impacting Bhutan and bringing the strategic Siliguri Corridor (India's narrow land link to the Northeast) under direct Chinese observation.
The article highlights the broader security implications of the border negotiations. While confidence-building measures (CBMs) like establishing new meeting points and hotlines under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) are positive steps, they should not obscure the lack of progress on a comprehensive boundary settlement. Furthermore, China's ongoing infrastructure development, such as roads and military facilities in western Bhutan since the 2017 Doklam standoff, demonstrates a strategy of altering the status quo on the ground to gain de facto control. The mention of the Medog County project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River (Brahmaputra) also raises significant security concerns. Building the world's largest hydropower plant close to the border in a highly earthquake-prone zone poses severe risks of flash floods downstream in India, necessitating robust hydrological data sharing agreements.
Key references
AI-generated study notes, sourced from The Hindu. Verify facts and figures with standard sources.