ECI recommendation to restrict candidacy from one constituency yet to be implemented: Madras High Court

This issue is rooted in the statutory framework governing Indian elections, specifically the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA). Under Section 33(7) of the RPA, a candidate is permitted to contest a general election or a group of by-elections or biennial elections from a maximum of two constituencies. Prior to an amendment in 1996, there was no limit on the number of constituencies a candidate could contest from. The 1996 amendment restricted this number to two. The ECI, in its 2004 proposals on electoral reforms, advocated for amending Section 33(7) to restrict candidacy to a single constituency, arguing that dual candidacy strains public resources. When a candidate wins both seats, they are compelled by Article 101(1) of the Constitution (for Parliament) or Article 190(1) (for State Legislatures) to vacate one, necessitating a by-election. This imposes a significant financial burden on the state exchequer and administrative machinery, and also leaves the voters of the vacated constituency unrepresented until the by-election concludes.

From a governance perspective, the failure to implement this reform highlights a persistent gap between the recommendations of Constitutional bodies like the Election Commission of India and legislative action by Parliament. The ECI's alternative proposal—that if dual candidacy is retained, the candidate vacating a seat should bear the cost of the ensuing by-election—attempts to create a financial disincentive against frivolous multiple candidacies and protect public funds. The Law Commission of India, in its 255th Report (2015) on Electoral Reforms, endorsed the ECI's view, recommending the restriction of candidacy to one constituency. It suggested that if this was not feasible, a heavy deterrent fine (e.g., ₹5 lakh for an Assembly election and ₹10 lakh for a Parliamentary election) should be levied on the candidate vacating a seat. The continued inaction on these recommendations points to the complex political economy of electoral reforms, where legislative bodies are often reluctant to alter rules that major political actors utilize strategically.

The observation by the Madras High Court represents a form of judicial nudging regarding electoral reforms. While courts generally refrain from directing the legislature to enact specific laws (respecting the separation of powers), they frequently highlight anomalies or outdated provisions that impact democratic processes or public resources. The Supreme Court of India has occasionally intervened in electoral matters to enhance transparency and fairness (e.g., the introduction of NOTA, mandatory disclosure of criminal antecedents). However, regarding Section 33(7) of the RPA, the Supreme Court in the past (such as in the case of Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India, where the petition was dismissed in 2023) has typically maintained that altering this provision falls within the domain of legislative policy, not judicial review. The Madras High Court's recent remarks serve as a reminder of the pending reform agenda and may spur public debate, even if they do not constitute a binding legal directive on Parliament to amend the law.