Revamp functioning of Parliament

The core constitutional issue revolves around Article 81 (composition of the Lok Sabha) and the impending lifting of the freeze on Delimitation mandated until after the first census post-2026. Increasing the strength of the Lok Sabha from 543 to a projected 850 members aims to address the sheer volume of constituents per MP (currently averaging 1.8 million) and correct regional disparities (e.g., Malkajgiri vs. Lakshadweep). However, this arithmetic solution overlooks the functional capacity of the House. Representation is not just about the ratio of citizens to MPs; it is about the effectiveness of that representation on the floor of the House. If the number of MPs increases but the operational timetable of Parliament remains static, the individual agency of an MP to voice constituent concerns is mathematically diluted. This highlights the tension between substantive representation (quality of debate and scrutiny) and descriptive representation (numbers).

The article highlights a critical deficit in executive accountability caused by shrinking parliamentary time. Crucial accountability mechanisms are being marginalized. The Question Hour (governed by Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha), which allows MPs to seek oral answers (starred questions) and written answers (unstarred questions), often falls victim to disruptions or curtailed sessions. The article cites the 17th Lok Sabha where Question Hour functioned for only 60% of its scheduled time. Similarly, Zero Hour (an Indian innovation for urgent unnotified matters) and Private Member's Business (allowing non-ministers to introduce legislation) are squeezed. The passage of 80% of the national budget via the guillotine procedure (passing outstanding demands for grants without debate) and 35% of bills with less than an hour of debate indicates a breakdown in the deliberative function of the legislature. Adding 300 more MPs into this constrained system will only exacerbate the bottleneck, rendering individual MPs largely silent.

To address this institutional blind spot, specific parliamentary reforms are necessary. Currently, Article 85(1) of the Constitution only mandates that the President summon Parliament such that six months do not intervene between sessions. It does not prescribe a minimum number of sitting days. The article advocates adopting the recommendation of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC) to legally mandate a minimum of 120 sitting days per year for the Lok Sabha. Furthermore, accountability tools like Question Hour and Zero Hour should be granted protected statutory status, preventing their cancellation or curtailment by the Speaker. Finally, the capacity of the Parliamentary Standing Committees (currently capped at 31 members) must be expanded proportionally to accommodate the increased number of MPs, ensuring deeper scrutiny of legislation and policies outside the chaotic floor of the House. These reforms are essential to transform a numerically larger Parliament into an effective deliberative body.