Revisiting India’s nuclear doctrine without revising it

India’s nuclear doctrine, operationalised in 2003 following the 1998 Pokhran-II tests and the 1999 Kargil conflict, is built on three pillars: No First Use (NFU), Credible Minimum Deterrence, and Massive Retaliation in response to a nuclear attack on Indian territory or forces. The doctrine aims to deter nuclear use by adversaries while maintaining strategic restraint under civilian control, managed by the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). However, the strategic environment has evolved. The doctrine was framed when China and Pakistan posed distinct challenges; today, their deepening military and strategic alignment creates the complex scenario of a 'two-front' nuclear pressure. Furthermore, Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) (low-yield weapons for battlefield use) aims to lower the nuclear threshold and counter India's conventional superiority, directly challenging the credibility of India's 'massive retaliation' posture. A review of the doctrine must assess if massive retaliation remains a credible and flexible response to a limited TNW strike.

A crucial aspect of nuclear deterrence is survivability—the ability of nuclear forces to survive a first strike and launch a devastating counter-attack (a second-strike capability). This is primarily achieved through a nuclear triad (delivery systems across land, air, and sea, particularly through submarines like the INS Arihant). The article highlights how emerging technologies are reshaping the deterrence landscape. Artificial Intelligence, cyber-warfare capabilities, space-based surveillance, hypersonic glide vehicles, and ballistic missile defence (BMD) systems are compressing decision-making timelines and increasing the vulnerability of command-and-control (C2) networks. These technologies complicate assumptions about assured retaliation. Therefore, a doctrinal review should focus on modernising delivery systems, hardening cyber resilience, and ensuring the absolute survivability and intelligence integration of the C2 infrastructure to maintain the credibility of deterrence.

The global geopolitical architecture has shifted significantly since 2003. The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the primary theatre of great-power competition, moving the international system toward multipolarity. The doctrine must account for these wider shifts, such as the intensifying US-China rivalry and closer China-Russia coordination. Crucially, the article cautions against revising the declaratory policy, particularly abandoning NFU. The NFU posture has been instrumental in cementing India’s image as a responsible nuclear state, distinguishing it from Pakistan and aiding its integration into the global non-proliferation order (such as gaining waivers from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) despite not being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)). Ambiguity regarding NFU could destabilise the region, encourage pre-emptive actions by adversaries during a crisis, and undermine India's diplomatic standing. The focus, therefore, must remain on strengthening capabilities to back the stated policy, reinforcing strategic autonomy.